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MEMORIAL: DONALD P. KOMMERS – A MEMORIAL COLLECTION
What We Teach When We Teach German Constitutional
Law: An Introduction to the Collection Memorializing
Donald P. Kommers
By Russell A. Miller*
Donald P. Kommers† (1932-2018)
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A. Introduction
My German colleagues sometimes express surprise when they learn that I lead an annual semi-
nar on German constitutional law at my American law school. “Are American students really
interested in German law,” they ask with incredulity. This may be a case of coy self-satisfaction.
Or is it a well-deserved dig at American parochialism and constitutional exceptionalism? In
truth, it is the question that is surprising. Germany has a prominent place in comparative con-
stitutional law’s canon, and German constitutional law has achieved particularly high standing
in American comparative law teaching. In comparative constitutional law courses and seminars,
for example, students regularly read the German Constitutional Court’s Abortion I Case1
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alongside the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade.2 Vicki Jackson and Mark Tushnet
feature thirteen translations of German Federal Constitutional Court decisions in their
groundbreaking American law school casebook Comparative Constitutional Law.3 Only the
United States Supreme Court, with sixteen featured cases, attracts more attention. The other
major comparative constitutional law casebook in the American market, Comparative
Constitutionalism, features three times as many German cases, a focus no doubt facilitated
by the fact that German Federal Constitutional Court Justice Susanne Baer is one of the book’s
co-authors.4
B. Donald Kommers’ American-German Constitutional Law
Americans’ interest in German constitutional law can be traced to a single source. Donald
Kommers, the political scientist and legal scholar at Notre Dame, pioneered the field of compara-
tive constitutional law and popularized German constitutional jurisprudence in the English-
speaking world with his groundbreaking study of the German Federal Constitutional Court,5
and his seminal, English-language treatise on German constitutional law that first published in
1989.6 The previously mentioned comparative constitutional law casebooks republish several
of Kommers’ translations of the Federal Constitutional Court’s cases. I also have been told that
many American comparatists teach from Kommers’ treatise, which possesses the functional title
The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany.7 The book’s original
commentary on German constitutional law is illustrated with translated excerpts from scores
of decisions from the German Federal Constitutional Court.
German constitutional law’s American success, based as it is on Kommers’ work, nevertheless
exposes some dramatic differences in the way German constitutional law is taught in America and
Germany.
To begin, there likely isn’t even a course in a German law school curriculum called
Verfassungsrecht (constitutional law). Instead, Germans are introduced to their system’s consti-
tutional precepts and principles in a series of courses entitled Staatsrecht (state law). The focus of
these courses is the Basic Law,8 and European Union law if a third semester is required.9 But the
name of these courses, with the priority it places on the state, which is seen as preceding and
superseding the constitution, suggests that Americans and Germans are in different theoretical
and pedagogical places when they teach constitutional law.10
More profoundly, Americans almost exclusively teach German constitutional law from
Kommers’ case translations. His work, and our teaching from the Federal Constitutional
Court’s opinions, align German constitutional law with the American case method and its roots
in the common law. But that is not how German constitutional law is done in Germany. Like
other fields of law, German law students encounter German constitutional law through the
2Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3rd ed. 2014).
4NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM (3rd ed. 2016).
5DONALD P. KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY (1976).
6See DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1989).
7I joined Kommers as a co-author of the book’s third edition. See DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (3rd ed. 2012).
8The typical textbooks and exam-preparation materials use the term Staatsrecht. See, e.g., CHRISTOPH DEGENHART,
STAATSRECHT I – STAATSORGANISATIONSRECHT (27th ed. 2011); THORSTEN KINGREEN & RALF POSCHER, GRUNDRECHTE –
STAATSRECHT II (33rd ed. 2017); ALFRED KATZ, STAATSRECHT – GRUNDKURS IM ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHT (18th ed. 2010).
9See, e.g., HEIKO SAUER, STAATSRECHT III – AUSWÄRTIGE GEWALT, BEZÜGE DES GRUNDGESETZES ZU VÖLKER- UND
EUROPARECHT (5th ed. 2018).
10See, e.g, JO ERIC KHUSHAL MURKENS, FROM EMPIRE TO UNION: CONCEPTIONS OF GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SINCE
1871 69-83 (2013).
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positivistic, deductive, conceptual, and dogmatic style that epitomizes German legal thinking.
That tradition places a priority on legal texts and the conceptual-systematic exegesis it is given
by legal scholars in sometimes sprawling commentaries. Even in constitutional law the German
approach bears unmistakable elements of the continental, civilian legal mentalité.11 There are
some notable casebooks in the German market.12 But they chart a course through Staatsrecht
that remains exceptional. Instead, German students learn the Basic Law’s regime as a complex
mechanism that produces constitutional results through the application of concepts and system-
atic analysis. It is true that some of the concepts and analyses are derived from Federal
Constitutional Court’s decisions. But they are learned as abstractions, and at a distance from
those cases.
The gulf that exists between the case-centric German constitutional law that American
comparatists teach and the dogmatic analysis that is taught in Germany has been repeatedly
underscored by my encounters with German law students. I often lead them in comparative
constitutional law seminars (taught in English from English-language materials) during which,
inevitably and happily, I have the privilege to present the Federal Constitutional Court’s
seminal Lüth Case. As with my presentation of the case to my American students, that effort
involves a close reading of Donald Kommers’ translation of the case.13 Unfailingly the German
students remark that this is the first time they have read the case, even if their studies have made
them familiar with disaggregated versions of the Lüth’smost prominent concepts and doctrine,
including the Federal Constitutional Court’s innovative conclusions about the Basic Rights’
status as objektive Wertentscheidungen (objective order of values) and the Basic Rights’
resulting mittelbare Drittwirkung (indirect horizontal effect) throughout the legal system.
But reading Lüth also requires students to engage politically with the facts of the case,
including Germany’s National Socialist past, the role of art in tyrannical regimes, and the power
of judges to respond to those vast problems. I sometimes show the students a clip from Viet
Harlan’s grotesque, anti-Semitic film Jud Süß,14 before asking them whether the Federal
Constitutional Court really had an alternative to its groundbreaking ruling in the case. It is
a German constitutional law channeled through the American case-method and colored by
American legal realism. It could not be farther from the traditional, abstract German
Lösungsskizze (solution outline) through which German students engage with the case. That
systematic encounter with the Lüth Case focuses on its relevance to Article 5 of the Basic
Law, and it raises three basic questions: what is the Schutzbereich (scope) of Article 5;
whether there has been an Eingriff (encroachment) upon that constitutional right; and
whether there is a Verfassungsrechtliche Rechtfertigung (constitutional justification) for the
encroachment.
American comparatists’ stubborn reliance on the case-method to teach German constitutional
law – a posture both facilitated and reinforced by Kommers’ decision to focus his immense
energies on the Federal Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence and not on the scholars’ legal-
scientific engagement with Staatsrecht – has helped produce a curious hybrid American-
German constitutional law. It is a dream of the German law that is both doctrinally faithful
and stylistically chimerical. Our German constitutional law is not Germany’s constitutional
law. It is Donald Kommers’ American-German constitutional law.
11See, e.g., RUSSELL A. MILLER, Germany’s German Constitution, 57 VA. J. INT'L L. 95 (2017-2018).
12See, e.g., CASEBOOK VERFASSUNGSRECHT (CHRISTIAN BUMKE & ANDREAS VOSSKUHLE eds., 7th ed. 2015).
13See, e.g., Justin Collings’ essay in this collection.
14It was Erich Lüth’s call to boycott Viet Harlan’s post-war films that led to the case. Lüth was appalled that Harlan, who
had directed the 1940 film Jud Süß, was returning to mainstream filmmaking.
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C. A Collection Memorializing Donald Kommers
It is the rare scholar to whom we can attribute the original invention of a new normative universe.
But Donald Kommers was that rare scholar. It is with deep sorrow that we acknowledge his pass-
ing in December 2018.15
The field of comparative constitutional law lost a pioneer. German-American relations lost a
steadfast bridge. Many colleagues and friends will miss him beyond words.
15See Russell Miller, German Constitutional Law's Irreplaceable Ambassador to the World, FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINEZEITUNG – EINSPRUCH MAGAZIN (Jan. 16, 2019), available at https://einspruch.faz.net/einspruch-magazin/
2019-01-16/a54cb2674c33c0f8b5882e1f416ec910/?GEPC=s5.
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